Arguing Against Personhood and Potentiality
... I will argue that Warren’s concepts of “human”, “personhood”, fetal development, and potential personhood, as they relate to abortion, are unsatisfactory. ... ” The ideas of personhood are used by Warren to determine what entities are and are not persons, and how this decision affects its moral rights and moral worth. Her five abbreviated criteria for personhood in relation to moral worth are as follows: consciousness (ability to feel pleasure or pain), reasoning (the ability to problem-solve), self-motivated activity, the capacity to communicate and lastly the presence of self-concepts and self-awareness. ... Warren goes onto say that, with these characteristics of personhood, “a genetic humanity is neither necessary nor sufficient for establishing that an entity is a person (602).” Her opinion that “some human beings are not people and there may well be people that are not human beings”, reinforces the fact that genetics does not pertain to the personhood. ... In proving her thesis, she states that a fetus occupies none of the traits of personhood, and thus is a human being who is not yet a person, and therefore has no moral rights. ... Warren’s last argument supporting abortion is the defense against potential personhood, i. ... This strong prima facie reason against abortion, nonetheless, does not mean one has to “conclude a being has a right to life, by virtue of that potential (603). ... Also, I do not agree with the traditional argument against abortion, as far as it is wrong to kill innocent human beings. ... However, even if we grant that Warren’s argument so far is correct, her idea of moral community and personhood are fallacious. The moral community is based on five attributes, which thus determine personhood. ... ” Obviously, this lack of pain does not mean they have lost their personhood, for they will regain consciousness, i. ... Are we to regard them without personhood, and view it as acceptable to kill them? ... ” Through her own argument, Warren strips not only a fetus, but infants, those with dementia, mentally handicapped humans, and Alzheimer’s patients of personhood, not to mention those who are not conscious. ... ” Again, if one takes this attribute in a stronger sense, Warren disallows personhood to “the very young, the very old, the mentally handicapped, and even the addicted”, because they all lack self-motivated activity in a sense. ... Then it seems the personhood of the fetus is secured, “for this developing human being has the potential for such awareness.” To sum up the reasons contrary to her personhood argument, take an inebriated college student. He/she could not pass any of the criteria for personhood. ... However, even if one grants that Warren’s distinction is still justified after my arguments, her arguments for fetal development and potentiality are still false.