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Papers > History > RISING ALLIANCE ITALY AND GERMANY AFTER THE ETHIOPIAN WAR
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RISING ALLIANCE ITALY AND GERMANY AFTER THE ETHIOPIAN WAR |
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... Marie Louise Recker A RISING ALLIANCE : ITALY AND GERMANY AFTER THE ETHIOPIAN WAR ANDREA PALAZZO Erasmus student Università La Sapienza Roma Ginnheimer Landstrasse, 42 (n. ... THE WAR IN ETHIOPIA pag. ... THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE pag. ... THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR AND THE “AXIS” pag. ... On the other it showed an increasing discontent, especially after 1926, in order to spread abroad what was called a “revisionism of the international relationships”, claiming a major role for Italy among European nations . After World War I, the expression of a mutilated victory became very popular in Italy, referring to the unsuccessful annexation of Dalmatia (that would have led to a complete dominion of the Adriatic Sea) as stated in the clause of the London Pact, subscribed in 1915, meant as a reward for the Italian participation to the war against Austria and Germany, her former allies . ... An expansion of the Italian territories in Africa was considered by Mussolini to be an irrefutable right, comparing the dimensions of French or English colonies to the smaller extent of Somaliland, Eritrea and Libya, the only portions of the African continent owned by Italy at the end of the 20’s. ... Hence the effort to create a more glamorous colonial war : Mussolini needed to justify fascism by success and prove in battle the virility of his regime and people. In any case, the possession of a great colonial empire was not only a matter of prestige, grandeur and geopolitical strategies but an important element in the economies of western European countries, meaning trade interests, investments and the search for raw materials, something Italy has always lacked. ... The growing success of the Nazis in Germany and the Japanese invasion of Manchuria induced him to consider a more dynamic course of action . ... As a result, Mussolini was convinced that the League as constituted would have never allowed Italy’s revisionism. As a means of establishing Italian leadership in Europe, the Duce proposed a four-power pact, to include Britain, France, Italy and Germany. Here was the alternative for the League, a directorate of four great nations to coordinate and conduct the direction of the future of Europe, with a sympathetic hearing for Italy’s ambitions. ... The real turning point came with the Abyssinian affair : after the failure of the four-powers pact Mussolini abandoned any possible arrangement with the League of Nations turning his sights on Africa and starting preparations for the long-awaited colonial war. ... It was the same country which had inexplicably defeated Italy in 1896, a defeat which still rankled the nation. ... Often since the disaster in Adowa, and last in 1925, Great Britain had led Italy to believe an agreement was not impossible, but the major opposition to a rising Italian influence over Abyssinia had always come from France, which had vital interests in the region . Surprisingly, in the early 30’s, the twenty year dissent between Italy and France (Italian dynamism, in the Balkans specially, was viewed with suspicion from the French Little Entente) was close to an end after the nomination of a new foreign minister in Paris, Louis Barthou . Barthou clearly thought Germany was the first enemy France had to worry about and started a policy of alliances in order to isolate Hitler, who had left the League of Nations in 1933. His policy started with the USSR in 1934, marking the pinnacle of French policy against Germany, and continued with Mussolini. ... Barthou’s successor, Pierre Laval, continued the approach to Italy. ... It was soon clear to Italian diplomats that the principal objection raised by their English colleagues concerned the Ethiopian membership to the League of Nations - Ethiopia was admitted in 1923 thanks to the diplomatic abilities of Regent Tafari, who was later going to become Emperor of Ethiopia in 1930, changing his name in to Hailè Selassiè - . Great Britain was unanimously considered the major European power after winning the First World War and was supposed to lead a crucial role in order to guarantee the pacts that gave birth to the League. ... This was indeed considered the most effective remedy to the rising of a decolonization movement, a clear reassertion of the European strength in Africa. ... The main subject of the conference had been the condemnation of Germany after the re-introduction of compulsory military service. ... The Stresa Conference turned out to be one of the last occasions for Italy, France an Great Britain to show a united front against Germany. ... THE WAR IN ETHIOPIA The Duce considered Ethiopia the “test stand” on which he would have recognized the “true friends of Italy”. ... Considerable efforts were made by the League of the Nations, particularly by Anthony Eden, the British Minister for League Affairs, trying to persuade Italy to accept League-appointed arbitrators. ... Mussolini believed that nothing in Europe would stand in his way : to win Ethiopia “Italy would do it by herself”, regardless of Geneva or London. ... Eventually, on October 3 (after the rains had ended in the Ethiopian highlands), Italian troops advanced into Abyssinia on separate fronts, moving southward from the colony of Eritrea and northward from Italian Somaliland. It had to be an “old style” colonial conquest, for there was no declaration of war. The League Council declared Italy to be the aggressor, only Albania, Austria and Hungary refused to join the condemnation . By the end of the month, economic sanctions were imposed : an arms embargo, financial measures including the refusal of loans and credits and an embargo on the export to Italy of materials needed to make war. ... They seemed to prove that Italy was persecuted and encircled, that it was the nation and not the regime which was in danger. The propaganda machine continued to encourage the idea of Italia contra mundum, of a selfish Britain unjustifiably opposing Italy’s legitimate national aims. ... Another basic theme used by diplomats and propagandists of the fascist government to justify Italy’s war of invasion was the “continued aggression” of the Ethiopian army, viewed as a direct and immediate threat to Italy. |
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Title: RISING ALLIANCE ITALY AND GERMANY AFTER THE ETHIOPIAN WAR
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